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The Socio-Economic Relations of Warfare
and the Military Mortality Crises of the Thirty
Years' War
QUENTIN OUTRAM*
Introduction
Michael Flinn wrote that the Thirty Years' War, fought in central Europe between
1618 and 1648, "remains the classic study of the military causation of mortality
crises".' Despite these words, the Thirty Years' War has rarely been studied from
this perspective. In what follows, I seek to explain the enormous demographic loss
experienced during the War. In doing so, I find that the socio-economic relations of
warfare and, in particular, the nature ofcivil-military relations during the War form
a key element of the explanation. The wider import of this paper is therefore that
the new approach to the history of mortality, in which the contributions of social
action and personal behaviour to mortality changes have been investigated and
highlighted, is one which promises a significantly deeper and more successful account
ofthe military mortality crises which punctuated the past and continue to afflict the
present.
In the next section I first establish the scale of the demographic loss and
introduce the conventional explanations for it. I then examine the possible
components ofdemographic loss, quickly focusing on mortality, and demonstrating
that plausible estimates ofbattle mortality are insufficient to explain any substantial
part of the demographic loss. Contemporary records, of which I introduce a new
analysis, indicate that the leading cause of death in the civilian mortality crises
of the War were plague and hunger, in other words the leading causes of crisis
mortality in peacetime as well as wartime early modern Europe. This raises the
question to what extent the mortality crises during the War were, in fact, caused
by the conflict or merely coincident with it. I will suggest that the War was
indeed causal for a large part of the mortality of the period and that an
acceptable explanation of the demographic loss must explain how the War
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intensified, multiplied and/or lengthened the usual mortality crises of early modern
Europe.
Three models explaining the impact of warfare on civilian mortality can be
distinguished in the existing literature on the Thirty Years' War. These are the
"synergy" model in which undernutrition causes deaths from disease, the "hunger"
model in which undernutrition leads directly to excess mortality, and the
"transmission" model in which troop movements and civilian distress migration
cause unusually high fatality rates by increasing the transmission of infectious
disease. The latter two models presage a new account in which the "socio-
economic relations of warfare" are central to understanding the dynamics and
scale of this military mortality crisis. I argue that nutrition-infection synergies
explain little in the case at hand but that an examination of the economic and
social relations between the civilian population and the military forces active in
the War reveals the dynamics that led to both a heightened incidence of subsistence
crises and a heightened exposure to fatal epidemic disease. The final section
contextualizes the "socio-economic relations of warfare" model within recent
contributions to demography and demographic history and indicates briefly how
the "socio-economic relations" model can help us understand variations in wartime
civilian mortality.
Losses and Reasons: The State of Research
The demographic history of the Thirty Years' War continues to circle around the
figure of Gtinther Franz and his conspectus of the demographic impact of the War,
first published in 1940. This suggested that "in the 30 years of crisis, about 40 per
cent of the rural population fell victim to the War and epidemics. In the cities, the
losses may be estimated at only 33 per cent".2 With a German population ofperhaps
15 million in 1618, Franz's conclusion implies a loss approaching 6 million people.
Franz's own book makes it clear that his summary is inaccurate, however, even
disregarding, for the moment, the numbers he gives. It consists ofa survey ofa very
large number of local demographic studies. From these Franz sought estimates of
pre-war and post-war populations, defining "post-war" as the point at which
population movements in response to the conflict had ceased.3 The result is therefore
an estimate ofdemographic loss which includes all the possible effects on population
including changes in mortality from whatever cause, reductions in fertility and
permanent net migration. Hence, to say that "40 per cent fell victim to war and
epidemics" is potentially misleading.
S H Steinberg made an early attack on Franz's study which was pursued with
an aggression which seems to have obstructed both a close reading of Franz's
2G Franz, Der Dreissig/dhrige Krieg und das 3Franz, op. cit., note 2 above, p. 2.
deutsche Volk, 4th ed., Stuttgart, Gustav Fischer,
1979, p. 59, translation from J Theibault, 'The
demography of the Thirty Years' War re-visited:
Gtinther Franz and his critics', Ger. Hist., 1997,
15: 1-21, p. 4.
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work and accurate arithmetic.4 Nevertheless, Steinberg's bluster appears to have
brought about a timid retreat among Anglophone writers and for many years it
has been conventional to repeat "conservative" "estimates" of demographic loss
of "15 or 20 percent",5 numbers apparently pulled out of thin air.6 The reasons
for reducing Franz's estimates have been various. The more substantial criticisms
are, first, that the local studies on which he relied usually reported changes in
the number of households, not the number of people; second, that the method
by which Franz moved from local estimates of population loss to regional and
national totals is unclear; and third, that the fiscal surveys that form a major
source for the demographic studies he surveyed were distorted in an attempt to
reduce consequential tax burdens. It is certainly possible that an increase in
household size occurred but to explain the entire apparent population loss in
this way would require wholly improbable changes. Franz's movement from local
to regional and national estimates appears to have been purely judgemental and
it is possible that the coverage of the local studies on which Franz relied were
biased towards the worst cases. Nevertheless, critics have been unable to bring
forward new data to substantiate this claim. The last of these criticisms is less
powerful than it might appear. As John Theibault points out, tax-gatherers, who
were the main compilers of the records, were not naive and had an incentive to
counter downward distortions.7 Moreover, demographic studies based on parish
registers and other non-fiscal records tell a story broadly consistent with those
based on tax data.8 The most important of these studies is Edward Eckert's
examination ofplague and pestilential mortality in central Europe in the 1560-1640
period based on 807 parish registers, supplemented by printed sources based on
parish and civic records, giving mortality data on about 850 communities.9 Eckert
contrasts his estimates of mortality for five German provinces during the worst
period of the War, 1631-6, with Franz's estimates ofpopulation loss and concludes
"the estimates are of the same order of magnitude confirming that Germany
suffered a mortality crisis of exceptional intensity".'0
I can see no way to avoid this conclusion. It may appear less startling if set in
context. Massive demographic losses during periods of early modem warfare were
not unique to Germany. Ireland appears to have suffered catastrophic losses in the
4S H Steinberg, The 'Thirty Years War' and
the conflictfor European hegemony 1600-1660,
London, Edward Arnold, 1966; Theibault, op.
cit., note 2 above, pp. 6-7.
5C R Friedrichs, 'The war and German
society', in G Parker (ed.), The Thirty Years' War,
2nd ed., London, Routledge, 1997, pp. 186-92,
on p. 188.
6Friedrichs cites C McEvedy and R Jones,
Atlas ofworldpopulation history, London, Allen
Lane, 1978, pp. 67-72 as his source. McEvedy
and Jones give no evidence of their own, simply
citing some of Franz's Anglophone critics, none
of whom have come forth with alternative
estimates based on clear methodologies.
7Theibault, op. cit., note 2 above, p. 13.
8 Blaschke, Bev6lkerungsgeschichte von
Sachsen bis zur industriellen Revolution. Weimar,
Bohlau, 1967; P Stephan, 'Geburtlichkeit und
Kindersterblichkeit in einem Dorf im 17. und 18.
Jahrhundert', Arztl. Jugendkd, 1984, 75: 178-89; J
Theibault, German villages in crisis: rural life in
Hesse-Kassel and the Thirty Years' War,
1580-1720, Atlantic Highlands, NJ, Humanities
Press, 1995, pp. 166-74; Theibault, op. cit., note
2 above, pp. 14-16.
9E A Eckert, The structure ofplagues and
pestilences in early modern Europe: central Europe,
1560-1640, Basel, Karger, 1996.
' Ibid., p. 154.
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wars following the 1641 Rebellion.11 Poland in the period following the 1648-51
rebellion of Bogdan Chmielnicki presents another case.'2
The Components of Demographic Loss
Fertility
Few writers on the demographic impact ofearly modern warfare have had much
to say about the consequences for fertility. Myron Gutmann's work forms an
exception. His evidence suggests war delayed marriage and that undernutrition
causedbywarbroughtinfertility, increases inspontaneous abortionandmiscarriage.'3
Restricted to the period after 1665 by the lack of data, he shows a clear decline in
the number ofbaptisms during war-induced "years ofcrisis" in the 1670s (the Dutch
War), and in the 1690s (the War ofthe League ofAugsburg). "Yet childbearing was
never as severely reduced as mortality was increased. While the deadliest years ...
cost twice the normal number ofpeople their lives, the worst birth losses were about
one third in 1676 ... and less than 30 percent in 1694".'4
Theibault's study of the Werra region in Hesse-Kassel tells a different story.
Focusing on the village ofGrandenborn for which extensive demographic data exist,
Theibault shows it was hit by two major mortality crises, in 1626 and in 1636. In
the ten years between the two, the number of baptisms fell to an average of about
60 per cent of its pre-crisis level, and remained in excess of the number of burials.
In the ten years after the second crisis, however, the number of baptisms collapsed
to less than 25 per cent of the pre-1626 average. While baptisms remained in excess
ofburials in the period after 1636, the excess was insufficient to allow the population
to recover its pre-crisis levels within any moderate period of time. "The vital signs
of population growth were almost non-existent".'5
An analysis ofbaptismal data for Augsburg shows a similar, though less extreme
case. Between 1601 and 1631 the number of baptisms almost exactly matched the
number of deaths except in the "plague" years of 1607, 1627 and 1628. But when
Gustavus Adolphus finally brought the War to Augsburg in 1632, and the plague
with it, not only did burials rise, but between 1632 and 1635 the number ofbaptisms
fell to an average of about 65 per cent of the previous norm. With the return of
" P J Corish, 'The Cromwellian regime,
1650-60', in T W Moody, F X Martin and F J
Byrne (eds), A new history ofIreland, vol. 3,
Early modern Ireland 1534-1691, Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1976, pp. 353-86; L M Cullen,
'Economic trends, 1660-91', ibid., pp. 387-407,
on pp. 387-8; R Gillespie, 'The Irish economy at
war, 1641-1652', in J H Ohlmeyer (ed.), Ireland
from independence to occupation 1641-1660,
Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp.160-80, on
pp. 176-7.
2A Gieysztor, S Kieniewicz, E Rostworowski,
J Tazbir, and H Wereszycki, Histoire de Pologne,
Warsaw, PWN-Editions Scientifiques de Pologne,
1971, p. 277; idem, History ofPoland, 2nd ed.,
Warsaw, PWN-Editions Scientifiques de Pologne,
1979, p. 223; N Davies, God'splayground: a
history ofPoland in two volumes, vol. 1, The
origins to 1795, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981,
p. 467; W W Hagen, 'Subject farmers in
Brandenburg-Prussia and Poland: village life and
fortunes under manorialism in early modern
central Europe', in M L Bush (ed.), Serfdom and
slavery: studies in legal bondage, London,
Longman, 1996, pp. 296-310, on p. 307.
13 M Gutmann, War and rural life in the early
modern Low Countries, Princeton University
Press, 1980, p. 193.
14Ibid., p. 177.
'5Theibault, op. cit., note 8 above, p. 169.
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peace in 1636, mortality declined substantially, baptisms remained low, at only 55
per cent ofthe pre-war average though they stood slightly in excess of burials until
the War returned in 1646. During the final phase ofthe War, in 1646-8, a surprising
rise in baptisms failed to compensate for the rise in deaths.16
The absence ofsecure population figures and ofdata on age and gender structures
renders baptismal information difficult to interpret and computations of birth rates
impossible. However, comparisons of baptismal and burial data such as those
summarized above do at least suggest that, in the circumstances ofthe Thirty Years'
War, recovery from the more severe of the mortality crises it induced could not be
achieved easily by a subsequent excess of births over deaths.
Emigration
The level of net emigration from Germany during the Thirty Years' War is not
easy to establish. As we shall see below, there is no doubt that the War precipitated
numerouspopulation movements, someon alargescale, butmanyofthemtemporary.
The level ofpermanent net migration from Germany is difficult to assess in the face
of a general paucity of relevant statistical data. The possibility that it was high has
seemed increasingly plausible in recent years as historians have come to appreciate
the surprising amount ofmigration that occurred in normal times, especially among
the landless.'7
The main poles of attraction for those wishing to escape the Thirty Years'
War, or dispossessed by it, would have been the towns and cities of the
surrounding countries, including Switzerland and, especially, the prosperous and
growing cities of the Low Countries. Analyses of the birthplaces of non-native
inhabitants of such urban areas during the latter years of the War, frequently
available only for burgesses or guild members or other corporate memberships,
typically show a substantial German contingent. In those cases where it is possible
to compare the size of the non-native population over time, an increase in the
German contingent during the Thirty Years' War is often evident. In Leiden, for
example, the proportion of burgesses born in Germany rose from about 8 per
cent in the 1574-1619 period to about 19 per cent in the period 1620-99. " As
soon as one remembers that these percentages are proportions of small totals,
whether that total be the number of burgesses or the whole urban population,
the conclusion that permanent emigration to places outside the area of Franz's
Germany was small becomes inescapable.
So far, we have seen that those few historians who have attended to the impact
of the War on fertility have been impressed by its powerlessness to regenerate
16A Schreiber, 'Die Entwicklung der 'The population of late medieval and early
Augsburger Bevolkerung vom Ende des 14. modern Germany', in Bob Scribner (ed.),
Jahrhundert bis zum Beginn des 19. Germany: a new social and economic history, vol.
Jahrhunderts', Arch. Hyg., 1939-40, 123: 90-177, 1, 1450-1630, London, Arnold, 1996, pp. 33-62,
pp. 110-11. on p. 56.
17R Mols, Population in Europe 1500-1700, 18Mols, op. cit., note 17 above, pp. 50-2.
London, Fontana, 1972, pp. 48-50; C Pfister,
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populations in the face of some of the mortality losses sustained and that net,
permanent emigration can have formed only a small part ofthe overall demographic
loss. For these reasons, the explanation ofGermany's demographic catastrophe must
be sought in the impact of the War on mortality.
Mortality
Battle deaths we know were too few to account for much. We can say this despite
some suggestions that they exceeded two million for all belligerents combined, a
number which would, were it credible, go a long way towards explaining a demo-
graphic catastrophe.'9 These suggestions are based on the methodology first used by
Pitirim Sorokin. Sorokin took estimates of casualty rates from major battles and
applied these to estimated army strengths in each year of the War and summed the
results. The final figure is based on the idea that casualties can be calculated as if
all arose from one battle involving the whole ofevery army involved each year. Since
estimated casualty rates are frequently a quarter or a third of those engaged in
battle, the armies concerned were very large, and the War lasted for thirty years,
this procedure generates a huge total for casualties. Sorokin himself suggested
1,075,000 for "Austria-Hungary" (i.e. the German belligerents) for the War as a
whole.20 Double that to take account of non-German belligerents and one reaches
a figure such as that given by Jack Levy.
Sorokin's methodology has been or can be faulted at many points. First, while
the armies involved in the Thirty Years' War were very large by the standards
of the day, with an estimated 210,000 men under arms at the end of the con-
flict,2' this number never fought in a single action. Even in the major battles
(Breitenfeld in 1631, Rain in 1632, Lutzen also in 1632, Nordlingen in 1634 and
Jankov in 1645) only some 30,000 to 70,000 men were engaged.22 Second, Quincy
Wright early suggested that Sorokin's estimates involved an exaggerated assessment
of the frequency of battles in seventeenth-century warfare.23 Here it is possible
to offer some defence for Sorokin. There are obvious difficulties in deciding
precisely when a "battle" becomes so small that it should be treated as a mere
"skirmish". Consequently, lists of the War's battles vary substantially in length,
from the "important" twelve noted by Geoffrey Parker to the eighty-six "great"
battles counted by Gaston Bodart.24 Against the larger of these figures Sorokin's
assumption looks acceptable or even conservative. Third, Sorokin's figure for
'9E.g. J S Levy, War in the modern great table 1; Parker (ed.), The Thirty Years' War, 2nd
power system, 1475-1975, Lexington, University ed., op. cit., note 5 above, p. 116.
Press of Kentucky, 1983, table 4.1. 23Q Wright, A study ofwar, 2 vols, University
201p A Sorokin, Social and cultural dynamics, of Chicago Press, 1942, vol. 1, p. 232, note 46
vol. 3, Fluctuations ofsocial relationships, war, and and Appendix XXI, table 2.
revolution, New York, Bedminster Press, 1937, p. 24Cf. Parker (ed.), op. cit., note 5 above, pp.
566. xix-xlv; H Langer, The Thirty Years' War, Poole,
21 G Parker, The Thirty Years' War, London, Blandford Press, 1980, p. 8; G Bodart, Losses of
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984, p. 191; cf. p. 208. life in modern wars: Austria-Hungary; France,
22 F Tallett, War and society in early modern Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1916, p. 9.
Europe, 1495-1715, London, Routledge, 1992,
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"casualties" includes, at least in principle, the wounded as well as the dead.
Wright, claiming to follow Bodart,25 suggests that perhaps a quarter of casualties
died in this era so one may be justified in dividing Sorokin's estimate by four
to obtain an approximate figure of battle deaths. Fourth, as Boris Urlanis has
pointed out, some, perhaps 15 per cent, of the men dying in combat would have
died during the War in any case, which reduces the excess mortality due to the
War in proportion.26
Sorokin's methodology, although bold, suffers from serious flaws which seem, on
the whole, likely to generate a substantial overestimate of battle deaths. Other
estimates areconsiderably lower. Urlanis suggested that approaching 200,000 soldiers
ofall belligerents were killed in battle, with twice as many again dying from disease
(a cause of death excluded in Sorokin's methodology) giving a total reported as
600,000.27 Amending this figure to allow for the fact that some of these men would
have died anyway reduces the estimated excess mortality among all soldiers to half
a million, of German soldiers to perhaps a quarter of a million, in round figures. If
one agrees with Wright that Sorokin's estimates of battle casualties must be divided
by a factor of about four to obtain an estimate of battle deaths, one arrives at a
number in the region of250,000, about the same as Urlanis's figure for excess soldier
mortality but substantially in excess of his estimate of combat deaths. However,
none of these estimates exceeds about 5 per cent of the demographic loss to be
accounted for and indicates that battle deaths may be ignored as a significant source
of population loss in Germany. In France, where the data are rather more reliable,
it has been estimated that deaths in military service, including those from disease,
accounted for about 1.1 per cent of all mortality in the seventeenth century as a
whole.28 In Germany, where warfare blighted seventy-seven years of the century
rather than the forty-seven in France, one would expect a higher figure but any
plausible multiple would produce a figure which was still a small proportion of the
total demographic loss.
The above paragraphs are all concerned with deaths among soldiers. Violent
deaths of civilians perpetrated directly by the military appear to have been quant-
itatively quite insignificant.29 Schmolz and Schmolz's study of Landsburg am Lech,
based on parish registration data, notes that 30 civilians were murdered by Swedish
soldiers in 1632-3; Kisskalt's study of southern and central Bavaria, again based on
parish registers, notes 7 deaths at the hands of soldiers in Weiden, 40 in Bayreuth,
and 13 in Monheim.30
If battle fatalities were insignificant, we are left with deaths from hunger,
25Wright, op. cit., note 23 above, vol. 1, pp.
29Eckert, op. cit., note 9 above, p. 150.
243-4. A close reading of Bodart, op. cit., note 3 F Schmolz and T Schm6lz, 'Die
24 above, p. 20, suggests a fairer summary of the Sterblichkeit in Landsberg am Lech von
very limited evidence he reviews would be that a 1585-1875', Arch. Hyg. Bakt., 1952, 136: 504-40,
third or more of casualties were deaths. p. 525; K Kisskalt, 'Epidemiologisch-statistiche
26 B Urlanis, Wars andpopulation, Moscow, Untersuchungen iiber die Sterblichkeit von
Progress Publishers, 1971, p. 241. 1600-1800', Arch. Hyg. Bakt., 1953, 137: 37-41.
27Ibid., pp. 45, 150, 226.
28Wright, op. cit., note 23 above, vol. 1,
pp. 243-4.
157Quentin Outram
disease and combinations of the two. How important was hunger in comparison
with disease and what diseases were implicated? To answer these questions I
examined Gottfried Lammert's 1890 catalogue of death from sickness, hunger
and military action during the Thirty Years' War.3" His work is a listing with
brief details and some narrative contextualization of the mass mortalities in
Germany from 1600 to 1650. It combines the results of the local histories
available before 1890 together with the results of Lammert's own researches in
contemporary and near-contemporary chronicles and municipal and church records.
He was primarily interested in the history of epidemic disease and medicine and
it is possible that this biases his work towards deaths from disease. He did not
attempt a critical evaluation of his sources and this, together with the Romantic
pessimism prevalent in the German historiography of the time, suggests a high
degree of caution is necessary in using his work. Nevertheless, neither internal
evidence nor marked inconsistency with other sources indicate that the results of
Lammert's labours must now be jettisoned.
Lammert's catalogue is enormous and to ease the task I took a simple, systematic
one-in-four sample ofall page references in the index ofplaces to build up a picture
of mortality during the War. The results are given in Table 1. The final column of
Table 1 contains a letter for each reported mortality in Lammert's catalogue forming
ahorizontal bar chart which gives an immediate overview ofthe fluctuating incidence
ofmass mortality in Germany in the first halfofthe seventeenth century. The letters
indicate the reported cause of the mortality; they are decoded at the foot of the
table.
Table 1 represents the result of an extensive exercise in "retrospective diagnosis".
The reliability of such diagnoses is, of course, one of the enduring controversies of
historical demography. Friedrich Prinzing, one of the pioneer historians ofmilitary
mortality crises, stated pessimistically that "in most cases ... [during the Thirty
Years' War] it is impossible to state with certainty just what the individual diseases
were .32 Optimists have argued that a number of diseases of interest, for example,
bubonic plague and smallpox, have highly distinctive sets of symptoms and when
these are described by experienced contemporaries a retrospective diagnosis can
often be made with some confidence.33 Eckert has stressed the familiarity of plague
to central Europeans at the time and that few adults can have been unaware of its
symptoms and characteristics.34 However the retrospective differential diagnosis of
31 G Lammert, Geschichte der Seuchen-, effects in 16th and 17th century England, Matlock,
Hungers- und Kriegsnoth zur Zeit des 'Local Population Studies' for the S.S.R.C.
Dreissigjdhrigen Krieges, Wiesbaden, Dr. Martin Cambridge Group for the History of Population
Sandig, 1971 (original publication, Wiesbaden, and Social Structure, 1977, pp. 11-23, on pp.
1890). 18-19; J D Post, Food shortage, climatic
32 F Prinzing, Epidemics resultingfrom wars, variability, and epidemic disease in preindustrial
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1916, p. 25. Europe: the mortalitypeak in the early 1740s,
33This appears to have been the predominant Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1985, p. 229; P
view for some time: L Bradley, 'Some medical Slack, The impact ofplague in Tudor and Stuart
aspects of plague', Cambridge Group for the England, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul,
History of Population and Social Structure, The 1985, p. 8.
plague reconsidered: a new look at its origins and 34Eckert, op. cit., note 9 above, p. 23.
158The Military Mortality Crises ofthe Thirty Years' War
typhus, relapsing fever and typhoid fever is an impossible task; hence the grouping
together of these diseases in Table 1. For similar reasons, one has to simply accept
reports of "dysentery" as they stand, despite the ejection of this term from modem
medical discourse. Nevertheless, frequent contemporary references to "the bloody
flux" indicate that for seventeenth-century Germans the disease was symptomatically
well defined. Respiratory infections, including influenza and pneumonia, are notably
absent from the Table. This is consistent with Eckert's assessment based on the
evidence ofparish burial registers that suchdiseases were "improbable majorfactors"
in seventeenth-century mortality crises.35
Ifthe reader is willing to suppress his or her qualms on this matter, Table 1 allows
the following summary. The pre-war disease environment was dominated by bubonic
plague and there were widespread epidemics in 1607 and 1610-11 with a resurgence
in 1613. Epidemics of other diseases were extremely rare in comparison. The first
two decades ofthe century were free of any widespread deaths attributed to hunger
by contemporaries. The War had no significant impact on the pattern ofdearth and
disease until 1622. From 1622 to 1625, epidemics of typhus and dysentery occur a
little more frequently than before, although plague continues to dominate with a
widespread epidemic in 1625-6. The first reports ofhunger and famine in the sample
occur in 1623 and they continue to 1627 but remain exceptional. The big changes
start in 1631 after the entry of Sweden into the War. Deaths caused by hunger and
famine occur with increasing frequency, rising to a peak in 1634 but continuing for
the rest of the decade. A widespread and prolonged plague epidemic occurred
simultaneously. In the 1640s Germany was largely free of plague and other major
epidemics but intermittent hunger mortalities continued to the final year ofthe War.
"Poxes", appearing in the records as Blattern or Pocken and corresponding to
smallpox, measles and other exanthems, were of significance only towards the end
ofthe War and appear always to have had a minor role. The chronology ofdistress
in Table 1 conforms broadly to the emphasis of conventional historical writing.
Before the 1630s, this was just another European War. It was the agony of the
Swedish intervention of 1630-5 which set this conflict apart and made Germany a
byword for misery and death.36
Cause or Coincidence?
Epidemics ofplague were ofcourse nothing new in Germany, nor were subsistence
crises. Eckert has identified cycles of "continental" plague epidemics occurring
approximately once every ten years in central Europe in the 1560-1640 period and
35Ibid., p. 48. impact which he dates to 1626 for this area (op.
36Compare the reviews of the condition of the cit., note 8 above, p. 150). It was only in the
German people from the standpoints of 1620-1, 1630s that English pamphleteers began to notice
1630, and 1637 given in C V Wedgwood, The the War and "the appalling consequences of a
Thirty Years War, London, Jonathan Cape, 1938, particularly appalling war became familiar
pp. 146-7, 255-7, 410-14. At a local level, horrors" (B Donagan, 'Codes and conduct in the
Theibault's study of Hesse-Kassel documents a English Civil War', Past and Present, 1988, 118:
qualitative increase in the severity of the War's 65-95, p. 67).
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Table I
Analysis of Lammert's catalogues of mortalities: Germany 1600-50
Number of
places in
Year sample Reported causes of mortality
1600 1 S
1601 5 PPPPS
1602 2 SU
1603 2 UW
1604 3 PPP
1605 4 PPPP
1606 7 PPPPU UU
1607 25 PPPPP PPPPP PPPPP PPPPP PPTUU
1608 2 PP
1609 5 PPPPP
1610 12 PPPPPPPPPP PU
1611 40 PPPPP PPPPP PPPPP PPPPP PPPPP PPPPP PPPPU UUUUW
1612 9 PPPPPPPPP
1613 21 PPPPP PPPPP PPPPP TUUUW W
1614 1 P
1615 0
1616 1 P
1617 4 PTDD
1618 0
1619 3 PPU
1620 8 PPPPP S
1621 2 UU
1622 4 TTUW
1623 9 HPPPP DDUW
1624 9 HPPPT DDS
1625 37 HPPPP PPPPP PPPPP PPPPP PPPPP PPPPP PPPTT DU
1626 34 PPPPP PPPPP PPPPP PPPPP PPPPP PPPPU UUUW
1627 8 HPPPP PUU
1628 14 PPPPP PPPPP PPPU
1629 7 PPPPP PO
1630 9 PPPPP PPPU
1631 9 HHPPP PPTD
1632 23 HHPPP PPPPP PPPPP TTUUW MMM
1633 30 HHHHH PPPPP PPPPP PPPPP PTTTT SUUUM
1634 42 HHHHH HHHHP PPPPP PPPPP PPPPP PPPTT TDOUU UUUMM MM
1635 36 HHHHH HHPPP PPPPP PPPPP PPPPP PPPPT DUUUW
1636 20 HHPPP PPPPP PPPPP PPSSW
1637 18 HHPPP PPPPP PPPPP PSU
1638 6 HHHPP P
1639 5 HPPPP
1640 7 HPPPP SW
1641 3 HSW
1642 1 U
1643 2 PP
1644 1 H
1645 4 PPPM
1646 3 HPS
1647 0
1648 7 HHPPT SO
1649 3 PPP
1650 1 P
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Summary
Period Reported causes of mortality Number and percentage of Reports
1618-48 D: Dysentery, etc. 8 2%
1618-48 H: Hunger, etc. 43 12%
1618-48 M: Military action 9 3%
1618-48 P: Plague 224 64%
1618-48 S: Smallpox, measles, etc 9 3%
1618-48 T: Typhus, etc. 15 4%
1618-48 0, U, W: Unknown and other 40 12%
1618-48 All reported causes 348 100%
Codes:
D: dysenteric diseases.
H: "hunger" or "famine" or "scurvy" or "shortage of food" or "destitution" (1637).
M: references to military action without further explanation of cause of deaths, e.g.
"Swedish plundered" (1632), "Croatian troops (1632), "plundered" (1633),
"destruction" (1634), "military atrocities by the Swedes" (1634), "Swedish troops"
(1645).
P: "plague", "slight plague", "mild plague", "black death".
S: smallpox, measles, etc. ("Blattern", "Pocken").
T: typhus, relapsing fever, or typhoid fever ("hitzige Fieber", "Hitzige Kopfkrankheit",
"Ungarische Krankheit", "Hauptkrankheit", "Lagerpest", "petechialtyphus",
"Hauptweh", "Kriegstyphus", "ungesunde Kopfweh", "Kriegspest").
U: unknown or undefined disease ("plague-like disease", "plague-like epidemic"
"epidemic", "disease", "epidemic caused by flooding").
W: unknown or undefined.
0: other: "scarlet fever" (1629), "coughing fits amongst young and old" (1634),
"ergotism" (1648).
Other notes:
Where more than one cause of death is given the first to occur in the following list is taken:
hunger, etc., smallpox, etc., dysentery, typhus, etc., other disease, plague, unknown disease,
unknown cause of death. This procedure heightens the visibility of the changes wrought by
the War. Reports of animal diseases have been excluded.
Source: G Lammert, Geschichte der Seuchen-, Hungers- und Kriegsnoth zur Zeit des Dreissigidhrigen
Krieges, Wiesbaden, Dr. Martin Sandig, 1971 (original publication, Wiesbaden, 1890).
more frequent "maritime" epidemics affecting the North Sea and Baltic Sea coasts.37
It would have been remarkable ifGermany had escaped the plague during the thirty
years after 1618 even in the absence of war. Nor would a subsistence crisis during
37Eckert, op. cit., note 9 above, pp. 69, 75.
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this period have been a surprising event even had Germany been at peace; crises of
this kind continued to occur in Germany until the early nineteenth century.38 This
raises the question to what extent the mortality crises during the War were, in fact,
caused by the hostilities.
In the Europe of this period, peacetime subsistence crises were, of course, almost
always precipitated by poor harvests caused by abnormal weather conditions.
Agrarian histories and meteorological and harvest chronologies indicate a sequence
ofpoor harvests due to adverse weather conditions (not war-related factors) between
1622 and 1628.39 The European-wide harvest failure of 1635 seriously affected
Germany, as did poor harvests in 1636. Harvests in the 1640s were, however,
described as "good", "very good" or "ample".40 Yet this chronology fits the temporal
distribution ofreports of"hunger" less than perfectly. Although Table 1 shows some
reports ofhunger in the 1620s that coincide with poor harvests, the upsurge ofsuch
accounts in the 1630s begins before the harvest failure of 1635. In 1634, for instance,
Lammert described harvests as "sufficient" but only in "areas spared by troops and
mice".4' Reports of hunger continue for several years after the return to fuller
harvests in 1637 and even into the 1640s, though with lesser frequency. In 1648, for
instance, the harvest was generally good. To re-arrange a conclusion of Wilhelm
Abel, it would appear that "Nature did not create privation by itself, the War
contributed too".42
Few would go beyond this in asserting the independent impact of poor harvests.
However, the view that the demographic losses during the Thirty Years' War were
largely due to the independent impact of plague, especially the epidemic of 1632-7,
has been advanced by Karl Kisskalt who drew attention to very heavy plague
mortality in Milan, Verona and Venice during the epidemic of 1629-31.43 Although
his argument is-weakened by the fact that at exactly this time northern Italy was
itself involved in the War of the Mantuan Succession,"4 none of the cities he refers
38W Abel, Massenarmut und Hungerkrisen im
vorindustriellen Europa, Hamburg, Paul Parey,
1974.
3 Because I am concerned here with poor
harvests arising independently of the War, I have
ignored the grain price data, often used to make
inferences about the state of harvests.
40Lammert, op. cit., note 31 above, pp. 57-97,
247-71; Wedgwood, op. cit., note 36 above, pp.
216, 255; Abel, op. cit., note 38 above, pp. 149,
152; idem, Geschichte der deutschen
Landwirtschaft, Stuttgart, Eugen Ulmer, 1967, p.
242. The text is concerned with Germany as a
whole. The details given by Elsas for Augsburg,
Leipzig, Munich and Speyer; by Baumler for
Weiden; and Rodel for Mainz largely confirm
Lammert's and Abel's assessments: M J Elsas,
Umriss einer Geschichte der Preise und Ldhne in
Deutschland vom ausgehenden Mittelalter bis zum
Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts, 2 vols, Leiden, A W
Sijthoff's, 1936-49; D G Baumler,
'Medizinalstatische Untersuchungen uiber Weiden
(Oberpfalz) von 1551 bis 1800', Arch. Hyg., 1938,
120: 195-243; W G Rodel, Mainz und seine
Bevdlkerung im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart,
F Steiner, 1985.
41 Lammert, op. cit., note 31 above, p. 154.
42Abel, op. cit., note 38 above, p. 151.
43Kisskalt, op. cit., note 30 above. C M
Cipolla, Before the industrial revolution: European
society and economy 1000-1700, 3rd ed., London,
Routledge, 1973, table 5.3, presents data on this
epidemic for 17 cities in northern Italy, showing
crude death rates in 1630-1 varying from 10 per
cent in Empoli to 61 per cent in Verona with a
weighted average of 40 per cent. These 17 do not
include Casale or Mantua, which were besieged
during the War of the Mantuan Succession.
"Parker, op. cit., note 5 above, pp. 95-8.
162The Military Mortality Crises ofthe Thirty Years' War
to was attacked or besieged during this war. Kisskalt's general point that high
mortality from plague epidemics occurred in peace as well as in war at this period
has to be accepted.
Some indication of the scale of population decline that can be attributed to
"normal" peacetime epidemics and subsistence crises can be gained by reference to
the demographic simulation work by Alberto Palloni.45 Palloni modelled a number
of different "crisis regimes" distinguished by the underlying rate of natural growth
in non-crisis period, the frequency of mortality crises, their intensity and their
duration. Crisis incidence was modelled as a random variable with a Poisson
distribution. The application of Palloni's results to early modern Germany is un-
fortunately not straightforward: he appears to have had in mind a small population,
perhaps a village or town, when defining the various regimes he chose to simulate.
In a small population, we know that mortality crises, when they occurred, could be
of a devastating intensity. But for any one locality, such crises were rare. For a
largerterritory, comprisingmanyheterogeneousplaces, theintensityoflocalmortality
crises was diluted by the many localities which escaped them. Only very rarely did
an intense crisis affect the whole, or even a large part, ofa nation.' Thus over small
areas it seems appropriate to model crises as infrequent but of high intensity; in
larger territories it would be appropriate to model crises according to, perhaps, a
two-fold regime: one of high intensity but extremely low frequency superimposed
on another of high frequency (local crises occurring somewhere in the territory in
many years) but of very low intensity (the territory-wide mortality rate is little
affected).
Simulations for the two-fold regime suggested here for larger territories were not
carried out by Palloni but it is clear that the results of such an exercise would lie
between the results he reported for two other regimes. Both are based on an assumed
0.22 per cent annual growth rate in non-crisis periods, appropriate for the largely
stagnating pre-War German population.47 The first is defined by high crisis frequency
(100 crises per 1,000 years), high crisis intensity (increases in crude death rates of
80 to 90 per cent and pessimistic assumptions about crisis and post-crisis fertility),
and long crisis duration (five years of elevated crude death rates). The expected
population change after fifty years under this regime was found to be a loss of 37
per cent with a standard error of 11 per cent. The second regime is defined by low
frequency (30 crises per 1,000 years), low intensity (increases in crude death rates of
18 to 20 per cent and optimistic fertility assumptions) and short duration (two years
of elevated mortality). The expected population change after fifty years under this
regime was found to be a gain of 3 per cent with a standard error of 2 per cent. I
suggest, therefore, that a reasonable expectation of population change in early
modern Germany between say 1600 and 1650 in the absence of the Thirty Years'
War lies somewhere between a loss of 37 per cent and a gain of 3 per cent. These
45A Palloni, 'Comment', Popul. Dev. Rev., and R S Schofield, The population history of
1988, 14: 145-58. England 1541-1871: a reconstruction, Cambridge
4 S C Watkins and J Menken, 'Reply', Popul. University Press, 1989, table 8.12.
Dev. Rev., 1988, 14: 159-70, p. 169; E A Wrigley 47Pfister, op. cit., note 17 above, pp. 41-2.
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are uncomfortably wide limits but their mid-point, a loss of 17 per cent, gives us
some guide to the population loss that the ordinary hazards of early modem
European peacetime life might generate over fifty years. As the estimated actual loss
is ofthe order of40 per cent over thirty years, this suggests that the "special factor"
of the Thirty Years' War is indeed required to explain the demographic losses of
this period.
The Mechanisms of Demographic Loss
Before considering how the Thirty Years' War may have caused mortality, it
may help to illustrate the condition of Germany in the latter phases of the War.
The diary of William Crowne, kept for the Earl of Arundel during his 1636
embassy to the Emperor Ferdinand II, allows us to look at Germany through
the eyes of a contemporary.48 This source is untainted by many of the biases
that may be suspected in other documents of the period: it is written neither by
a victim nor a perpetrator of the violence; it is not an attempt to prove a point
about the War, it is not a plea for relief of taxation or other burdens; indeed
the comments on the state of Germany are off-hand and incidental to Crowne's
main concern: to celebrate the honour and status of the Earl. Unlike much of
the pamphlet literature of the time, the diary, published in 1637, did not seek
to sensationalize in the quest for sales, or to demonstrate the wickedness of
Protestant or Catholic.
The Earl left England in April, returning in December. His embassy took him
across Holland, up the Rhine and the Main and then south-east to the Danube,
finally arriving in Vienna in late June and Prague in July. The military context
was provided by the first moves in a Franco-Habsburg phase of the conflict that
was to last until the end of the War. During 1636, fighting was concentrated in
the Rhineland through which Crowne and Arundel travelled, and in the east in
an area distant from Arundel's journey. The most significant engagement Arundel
encountered was the siege of Hanau on the Main. The garrison, captained by
Sir James Ramsay in the Swedish service, had been besieged by Imperial forces
since the autumn of 1635. On his outward journey, Arundel passed within three
miles of the town, Crowne writing that "we considered ourselves to be in
considerable danger for we could hear the rapid discharge of the great guns".49
By the time of his return, in November, Hanau had been relieved. Crowne
reported what was no doubt told them by Ramsay, who entertained Arundel
and his party, that "[F]or a year and a half, Hannaw endured all the hardship
of a siege by the Emperor's forces, including a terrible plague from which
48W Crowne, A true relation ofall the diary, the Earl's letters and other contemporary
remarkable places andpassages observed in the sources with a catalogue ofthe topographical
travels ofthe Right Honourable Thomas Lord drawings made on thejourney by Wenceslaus
Howard... , London, 1637, reprinted in and Hollar, [London], Maggs Bros Ltd, 1963,
edited by F C Springwell, Connoisseur and pp. 54-135.
diplomat: the Earl ofArundel's embassy to 49Ibid., p. 60.
Germany in 1636 as recounted in William Crowne's
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22,000 people died in the space of seven weeks".50 As Lammert noted, this
number is surely exaggerated.5' The Hessisches Stddtebuch notes the presence of
plague and "Hungertyphus" during the siege, estimating that a third of the
population died. Population estimates for Hanau in the seventeenth century are
unavailable but the normal population of the old town did not exceed 3,000
before the middle ofthe eighteenth century although during the siege its population
was swollen by refugees and "strangers", as well as by Ramsay's garrison.52
The insecurity oflife and property pervade Crowne's diary. Arundel's party passed
through zones of active conflict protected by safe conducts provided by local
commanders but their main fears focused on bands of "rogues" and "Crabbats"
(Croats) "who lurked about the woods through which we passed".53 They spent one
night "walking up and down with carbines in our hands, and listening fearfully to
the sound ofshots in the woods around us".54 Later, Crowne reported that "[I]n the
woods alongside our route [between Wurzburg and Frankfurt] we kept seeing bands
of Croats who were pillaging and robbing the whole countryside".55 In August, two
of the Earl's senior servants and their local guide were murdered, possibly by
Nuremberger soldiers, possibly by "Croat marauders".56 Equally apparent is the
extent of the destruction wrought by the War: few bridges had been left standing
and the Earl's party passed through village after village that had been "pillaged and
destroyed"; "[flrom Cologne to Frankfurt all the towns, villages and castles are
battered, pillaged and burnt and at every one of our halts we remained on board,
every man taking his turn on guard duty".57
But most shocking to the party was the hunger. Sometimes, this is recounted
in stock phrases: "So difficult are conditions here that poor people are found
dead with grass in their mouths".58 Elsewhere, the comments are less stereotyped:
at Rtidesheim near Mainz, "His Excellency gave some relief to these poor wretches
who were so starved that they struggled with one another for the food which
he gave them".59 Similarly at Mainz: "So violently did these poor people struggle
when provisions were sent from our ship that some of them fell into the Rhine
and were in danger of being drowned".60 Beyond Wurzburg they passed through
Neustadt an der Aisch "which must have been a fine city, though now it lies
pillaged and with many houses burnt to the ground. Here, seeing wretched
children sitting at their doors almost dying of hunger, His Excellency ordered
that food and money should be given to their parents".6' On his return, Arundel
went ashore at Mainz "to see if it were in a better state than it had been on
our outward visit. Alas, it was in the same sorry state as before, with various
poor wretches lying on dunghills, almost starved to death and scarcely able to
crawl to receive alms from His Excellency".62
50Ibid., p. 88. 56 Ibid., p. 80 and pp. 127-8, note 179.
51 Lammert, op. cit., note 31 above, p. 201. 57Ibid., pp. 57, 59.
52 E Keyser (ed.), Hessisches Stadtebuch,
58Ibid., p. 58.
Stuttgart, W Kohlhammer, 1957, p. 220. 59Ibid., p. 59.
53Crowne, op. cit., note 48 above, p. 62. 6' Ibid., p. 59.
4Ibid., p. 60. 61 Ibid., p. 61.
55Ibid., p. 87. 62Ibid., p. 88.
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In contrast, plague, with which all the party would have been familiar, especially
after the English epidemic of 1625, is treated as no more than a normal hazard
of life. At Arnhem on the outward journey Arundel "promulgated certain orders
which we were all to observe particularly on account of the prevalence of plague
in this district".63 At Wesel, they spent the night on board their boats rather
than enter the town "for at this time more than thirty people a day were dying
of the plague"."' They took the same precaution at Bonn on their return journey.65
In December they passed through Nijmegen, learning that "12,000 of their
townspeople had died of the plague but now, thanks be to God, they are almost
free of plague there".66
Crowne's diary makes no attempt to explain the horrors he observed. For this we
must turn to models of the demographic loss and military mortality crises. The
historical literature on the Thirty Years' War contains two that are distinguishable.
In the first, the "synergy model", the plunder and destruction ofthe War led to poor
nutritional statuswhich lowered resistance toinfection by, andheightened theseverity
of, fatal epidemic diseases resulting in abnormally high levels of morbidity and
abnormally high case fatality rates combining to produce "crisis" levels ofmortality.
In the second, the "transmission" model, an increased rate of disease transmission
arose from troop movements and refugee fluxes.67
The "Synergy" Model
What one might call the "generalized" synergy model, in which undernutrition
increases the susceptibility to, or the severity of, all infections, although used to
great rhetorical effect by Thomas McKeown (1976), has now been jettisoned by
historical demographers in favour ofa "restricted" model in which synergies between
undernutrition and infection are admitted to exist for only a subset of diseases.68
Proponents oftherestricted synergymodelattempttoclassifythediseasesofhistorical
demography in three groups: those definitely synergistic with undernutrition, those
showing no synergy, and a residual class where little is known orthe evidence appears
equivocal; the latter is an unfortunately large class.
The first stage in the application ofthe synergy model is therefore the identification
of the diseases present in the historical episode of interest. As we saw above, it is
clear that bubonic plague, typhus and, possibly, relapsing fever, dysentery and
63Ibid., p. 55. University Press, 1985, pp. 51-66; Post, op. cit.,
64Ibid., p. 55. note 33 above, p. 228; idem, 'Nutritional status
65Ibid., p. 90. and mortality in eighteenth-century Europe', in
66Ibid., p. 92. L F Newman (ed.), Hunger in history: food
67 Both these models appear in Flinn's shortage, poverty, and deprivation, Oxford,
account, op. cit., note 1 above, pp. 52-3. Blackwell, 1990, pp. 241-80, on pp. 242-5, 257;
68 T McKeown, The modern rise ofpopulation, J Walter and R S Schofield, 'Famine, disease and
London, Edward Arnold, 1976; A G Carmichael, crisis mortality in early modern society', in
'Infection, hidden hunger, and history', in R I J Walter and R Schofield (eds), Famine, disease
Rotberg and T K Rabb (eds), Hunger and and the social order in early modern society,
history: the impact ofchangingfoodproduction Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 1-73, on
and consumption patterns on society, Cambridge pp. 18-19.
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typhoid, and to a much lesser extent smallpox and other "poxes", were the main
killers in the mortality crises of the War. The second stage is an assessment of the
degree of synergy, if any, between undernutrition and the diseases of interest. While
it has become conventional in demographic history to take the assessments of the
Bellagio Conferees as authoritative, doubts about some of their conclusions suggest
a more searching examination of the evidence is warranted.69 For bubonic plague,
the evidence is indirect. Medical scientists have not regarded a possible link between
nutritional status and the human susceptibility to, or rate of fatality from, cases of
bubonic plague as sufficiently interesting to warrant investigation.70 Demographic
historians have observed that "The [well-nourished] rich ... died of the plague as
did the [frequently undernourished] poor when the disease was present""7 and have
dismissed the often but not invariably observed link between poverty and the
incidence ofplague fatalities as the result of "variations in standards ofhousing and
hygiene which might attract or repel the rats and fleas which carried plague".72 Only
Stephen Ell has argued for a nutritional factor in susceptibility to the disease and
he advanced the now apparently mistaken hypothesis that the link is antagonistic,
not synergistic.73 It is often suggested that the extreme pathogenicity and virulence
of the plague bacillus renders the nutritional status of an infected patient irrelevant
69 Conferees [at the Bellagio Conference], 'The
relationship ofnutrition, disease, and social
conditions: agraphical presentation', in Rotberg
and Rabb, op. cit., note 68 above, pp. 305-8. S
Zurbrigg, 'Hunger and epidemic malaria in
Punjab, 1868-1940', Econ. Polit. Wkly. (India), 25
January 1992, 27 (4): PE-2-PE-26, has put forward
acarefullyconstructed argument based on
epidemiological data for a nutritional synergy in
the case ofmalaria, where the Conferees
considered synergydefinitely absent. Consultation
ofthemonumental work by F Fenner, D A
Henderson, IArita, ZJezek, and I D Ladnyi,
Smallpox anditseradication, Geneva, World
Health Organization, 1988, p. 196, reveals that
synergies between nutritional status and smallpox,
which the Conferees classed asdefinitely without
synergy, have never been researched.
7 Thestandard andencyclopaedic but now
dated work by R Pollitzer, Plague, Geneva, World
Health Organization, 1954, does not treat this
topic; L F Hirst, The conquest ofplague: astudy of
theevolution ofepidemiology, Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1953, notes briefly the conjunction between
famine and plague observed by someearly authors
but argues that the squalor and the consequent
presence ofrats in famine conditions is the causal
factor, not low nutritional status. A search ofthe
medical database Medline covering 1966-98 reveals
that the disease remains an active area ofresearch
but only one study which considers plague in
relation to overall nutritional status, a note by
Richard Pankhurst, the historian ofEthiopia.
Standard medical manuals, e.g., A S Benenson
(ed.), Controlofcommunicable diseasesmanual,
16th ed., Washington, American Public Health
Association, 1995, simply state that susceptibility
to the disease is "general".
71 A B Appleby, 'The disappearance of plague:
a continuing puzzle', Econ. Hist. Rev., 1980, 33:
161-73, p. 166.
72p Slack, 'The local incidence of epidemic
disease: the case of Bristol 1540-1650', in The
plague reconsidered, op. cit., note 33 above, pp.
49-62, on p. 54; idem, op. cit., note 33 above, pp.
91-3, 116-17, 121-3, 133-40, 159, 166.
3S R Ell, 'Immunity as a factor in the
epidemiology ofmedieval plague', Rev. infect. Dis.,
1984, 6: 866-79. Thehypothesis was that dietary
iron deficiencies provided some immunity to the
disease and this explained its supposed relatively
high incidence among adult males. Ell appears to
have mistaken the age and gender incidence ofthe
disease and the hypothesis flies in the face ofthe
very high morbidity and case fatality rates among
pregnant women, almostcertainly suffering from
anaemia in this period. On age and gender
incidence, cf. Ell, op. cit., and R S Schofield, 'An
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to the outcome. Jean-Noel Biraben's review of the historical evidence during the
second pandemic in Europe supports these conclusions.74
The evidence in regard to typhus is more controversial. Typhus has frequently
been associated with famine conditions, as the term "famine fever" indicates, and
its presence has sometimes been used by modern historians as evidence of "low
nutritional status".75 This assumption of a causal association receives some limited
support from early experimental studies of rats, including some by Hans Zinsser
and colleagues, which suggested that any one or more of a wide range of specific
vitamin deficiencies may increase the severity ofthe disease subsequent to infection.76
However, it is not clear that it is possible to generalize from studies of rat models
and the current position among medical scientists is thus one of agnosticism.77
Among historians, the general view has long been that the occurrence of typhus
epidemics is to be explained by overcrowding in cold and unhygienic conditions
such as those experienced by refugees fleeing wars and famines. Hence the empirical
conjunction of such epidemics with these phenomena.78
While historians have emphasized the role of overcrowding and questioned the
relevance of undernutrition in the genesis of typhus epidemics, the reverse is the
case with epidemics of relapsing fever. Although caused by different agents, the
epidemiology of relapsing fever is almost identical to that of typhus and the two
diseases frequently occur together. While it has never been identified as an important
source of mortality during the Thirty Years' War, it would be unwise to assume it
anatomy of an epidemic: Colyton November
1645-November 1646', in Theplague reconsidered,
op. cit., note 33 above, pp. 95-126, and S R Ell's
own 'Three days in October of 1630: detailed
examination ofmortality during an early modern
plague epidemic in Venice', Rev. infect. Dis., 1989,
11: 128-39. On plague and pregnancy, see Hirst,
op. cit., note 70 above, p. 73, B Velimirovic and
H Velimirovic, 'Plague in Vienna', Rev. infect.
Dis., 1989, 11: 808-26, and, again, Ell, 'Three
days in October', pp. 135-6.
74J-N Biraben, Les Hommes et la peste en
France et dans lespays europ&ens et
mediterran&ens, vol. 1, La Peste dans i'histoire,
Paris, Mouton, 1975, pp. 147-51.
75D J Oddy, 'Urban famine in nineteenth-
century Britain: the effect of the Lancashire
cotton famine on working-class diet and health',
Econ. Hist. Rev., 1983, 37: 68-86, pp. 83-4. Cf. A
Hardy, 'Urban famine or urban crisis? Typhus in
the Victorian city', Med. Hist., 1988, 32: 401-25,
p. 401; idem, The epidemic streets: infectious
disease and the rise ofpreventive medicine,
1856-1900, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993, pp.
191, 282-3.
76H Zinsser, M Ruiz-Castaneda and C V
Seastone Jr, 'Studies on typhus fever. VI. Reduction
ofresistance bydietdeficiency', J. exp. Med, 1931,
53: 333-8; F K Fitzpatrick, 'Susceptibility to typhus
ofrats on deficientdiets', Am. J. PublicHlth., 1948,
38: 676-81; N S Scrimshaw, C E Taylor and J E
Gordon, Interactions ofnutrition andinfection,
Geneva, World Health Organization, 1968, pp. 81,
93, 104, 110.
7 J C Snyder, 'Typhus fever rickettsiae', in F
L Horsfall and I Tamm (eds), Viral and rickettsial
infections ofman, 4th ed., Philadelphia, J B
Lippincott, 1965, pp. 1059-94, on p. 1076. Later
editions do not treat this topic.
78 This view was clearly enunciated by Hirsch
in the 1880s despite the fact that the transmission
mechanism of the disease was then unknown and
despite his adherence to miasmic theories of
disease: A Hirsch, Handbook ofgeographical and
historicalpathology, 3 vols, London, New
Sydenham Society, 1883-86, vol. 1, pp. 545-87.
As early as 1867, Maclagan had observed a
typhus epidemic during a time of economic
prosperity in Dundee and drawn the correct
conclusion that it was overcrowding brought
about by migration to the town and scarce
accommodation, not "want and misery", that had
caused the epidemic: T J Maclagan, 'Typhus
statistics of the Dundee Royal Infirmary with
remarks', Edinb. med. J., 1867-8, 13: 140-57, pp.
140-1. A similar case has been documented more
recently by Hardy and a similar inference made:
Hardy, 'Urban famine', note 75 above, p. 413.
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was absent. Anne Hardy has argued that relapsing fever, not typhus, is the "true
famine fever" but she is careful to base this characterization on the ground that case
fatality rates show an inverse relationship with social class. However, the research
evidence on which this is based is a single paper from the 1940s which employs a
methodology too badly flawed by absence of controls for it to be able to bear the
weight ofHardy's conclusion.79 The only other evidence for the view that nutritional
status has an effect on the case fatality rate in relapsing fever is based on ratmodels.80
Other writers have plausibly explained social class differences in crude mortality in
terms of differential standards of hygiene.8' To summarize, the evidence for the
existence of a link between nutritional status and either susceptibility to, or the
severity of, both typhus and relapsing fever is weak.
A connection between typhoid fever and nutritional status has been studied
relatively little. A series of experiments with mouse-typhoid suggest that protein
deficiencies increase the case fatality rate.82 The links between undernutrition and
acute diarrhoeal diseases, including those formerly referred to as "dysentery", have
been intensively studied and a number ofmechanisms by which undernutrition may
exacerbate the effect of acute diarrhoeal diseases have been identified.83 Work in
modern low income countries suggests that undernutrition, by impairing immunity
and other mechanisms, increases the incidence of diarrhoeal diseases and lengthens
their duration among children under five years old.' Studies ofadults are extremely
rare.
This survey of modern medical history makes it plain that, in the circumstances
of early modern Europe, the distinction between famine mortality and epidemic
disease mortality, commonly found in contemporary documents, is sustainable.
Starving civilians were no more susceptible to bubonic plague and suffered the
disease no less severely than the well fed. Although medical science has little to
say on the matter, the historical evidence suggests strongly that typhus epidemics
are a result of overcrowding in cold conditions, not low nutritional status. There
is no adequate basis for the view that epidemics of relapsing fever are substantially
different. With regard to typhoid fever, we have only experimental evidence to
support the supposition of a synergy between undernutrition and disease severity.
Only in the case of acute diarrhoeal diseases is there a well-established link
between low nutritional status and susceptibility to, and severity of, infection.
The history of epidemic disease mortality during the Thirty Years' War is
79A Hardy, 'Relapsing fever', in K F Kiple famine', in R D Edwards and T D Williams
(ed.), The Cambridge world history ofhuman (eds), The greatfamine: studies in Irish history
disease, Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 1845-52, Dublin, Browne and Nolan, 1956, pp.
967-70, on p. 968; M Gaud, and M T Morgan, 263-315, on p. 278.
'Epidemiological study of relapsing fever in north 2Scrimshaw et al., op. cit., note 76 above, p.
Africa (1943-1945)', Bull. Wld Hlth. Org., 1947/ 80.
48, 1: 69-92. 83 H L DuPont, 'Diarrheal diseases (acute)', in
8 K Guggenheim, E Buechler-Czaczkes and S Kiple, op. cit, note 79 above, pp. 677-80, on pp.
Halevy, 'The effect of protein deficiency on the 678-9.
resistance of rats to infection with spirochetes of 84 Briend, 'Is diarrhoea a major cause of
relapsing fever', J. infect. Dis., 1951, 88: 105-8. malnutrition among the under-fives in developing
81 Hirsch, op. cit., note 78 above, vol. 1, pp. countries? A review of available evidence', Eur. J.
611-12; W P MacArthur, 'Medical history of the clin. Nutr., 1990, 44: 611-28, on pp. 612-13.
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dominated by plague and, to a much lesser extent, diseases usually identified as
typhus but which may have been relapsing fever or typhoid. The diarrhoeal
diseases known to be synergistic with undernutrition are precisely those most
rarely encountered. I conclude that the "synergy" model is largely inapplicable
to the Thirty Years' War.
The "Hunger" Model
Thecorollary ofthisconclusionisthatmortalitycrisesdue tohungerandstarvation
will have frequently appeared as such, not as epidemics of infectious diseases. This
is indeed what the contemporary accounts suggest: Crowne always refers to the
"poor wretches" they encountered in Germany as "starved" or "dying of hunger",
not as suffering from disease; from plague victims they were careful to keep their
distance. I posit therefore a third model of military mortality crises: the "hunger
model". This section reviews the military and economic mechanisms that make up
this model and their operation in the Thirty Years' War.
Hunger was produced as a direct, designed consequence of military operations
of siege, devastation, and manoeuvre. In the Thirty Years' War sieges were
frequent but historians' highlighting of the most appalling instances (Breda, 1625,
Alte Veste (Nuremberg), 1632, Augsburg, 1634-5, Breisach (Baden), 1638) obscures
the fact that sieges were often ended quickly by surrender or storm, or were
relieved, or abandoned by armies that found themselves incapable of sustaining
them or that were withdrawn to fight elsewhere. The instances where a siege was
carried a la outrance, such as those listed above, were comparatively rare.85
Certainly, the mortality attributable to siege operations cannot account for any
significant part of the demographic losses of the War: perhaps 8,000 died at
Breda; it is reputed that 100 a day were buried during the three month siege of
Alte Veste (Nuremberg); nearly 11,000 burials were recorded during 1634-5 in
Augsburg, besieged for six months of these two years.86 Devastation, in the strict
military sense of the destruction of the assets and infrastructure of an area in
order to render it incapable of supplying troops or war materiel to an enemy,
was again comparatively rare; the prime example among the few that have been
suggested being the attempt by Gustavus Adolphus to lay waste Bavaria in
1632.87 It is unclear how effective this was. Commanders who were able to confine
their enemies to, or compel them to retreat through, areas incapable of sustaining
them purposely brought hunger and starvation to the enemy troops. The
85 See, for example, the detailed narrative 86Prinzing, op. cit., note 32 above, p. 72;
given in A W Ward, 'The Protestant collapse Wedgwood, op. cit., note 36 above, p. 330;
(1620-30)', idem, 'Gustavus Adolphus (1630-2)', Schreiber, op. cit., note 16 above, p. 111.
idem, 'Wallenstein and Bernard of Weimar 87 M Roberts, Gustavus Adolphus: a history of
(1632-5)', idem, 'The later years of the Thirty Sweden 1611-1632, 2 vols, London, Longmans,
Years' War (1635-48)', in A W Ward, G W Green, 1953-58, vol. 2, p. 703; Langer, op. cit.,
Prothero and S Leathes (eds), The Cambridge note 24 above, p. 107.
modern history, vol. 4, The Thirty Years' War,
Cambridge University Press, 1906, pp. 64-117,
190-222, 223-55, 364-94.
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outstanding example is the retreat of the Imperialists from Holstein to Bohemia
in 1644: according to a hostile but near contemporary chronicler only
1,000 of the 18,000 strong army completed the retreat.88 However, while food
was undoubtedly used as a weapon of war, the ability of early modern military
commanders to starve enemy troops into submission was limited by the defensive
and offensive actions of their enemies, and there is no evidence that civilians
were starved frequently or on a large scale by these operations.
Theeconomicmechanismslinkingearlymodernwarfarewithhungerandstarvation
were activated by military demands for food, fodder, shelter and supplies of other
war materiel from the German economy. The poor transportation systems of early
modem Europe precluded the delivery of significant quantities of supplies from a
foreign base. The bulk of an army's supplies therefore had to be obtained locally.
Satisfying the military's demands involved military personnel and local civilians
in extensive economic, political and social relationships. The character of these
relationships had a major impact on the rural and urban economies of Germany
and on the ability ofcivilians simultaneously to preserve their physical security and
their nutritional status. At first sight, the sheer scale of military demands on the
civilian economy seems sufficient to explain civilian hardship and hunger. Military
historians have emphasized the huge size ofthe armies involved in the Thirty Years'
War by the standards of the time: armies of 20,000 combatants were regarded as
large at the start of the War but, as early as 1627, Wallenstein, the commander of
the imperial army, had 100,000 men under arms; by 1631 Gustavus Adolphus
deployed about 130,000.89 The estimated 210,000 soldiers in the field at the end of
the War was a number without precedent.9 These huge bodies ofmen were attended
by a vast crowd ofcivilian "camp followers": women, children, servants and sutlers.9'
According to C V Wedgwood, as the War progressed the "tail" of camp followers
increased to two, three, four or even five times the number of soldiers.92 To move
their belongings and equipment required a scarcely less impressive number ofhorses:
perhaps two to four for each wagon, perhaps one wagon for every fifteen men:
perhaps 6,000 horses for an army of 30,000 men.93 Cavalry horses are in addition
to this number. Informertimes, armieshadcampaigned inthe summeranddisbanded
in the winter but in the seventeenth century this was no longer the case. While
campaigning might cease in the autumn, the armies continued in being at winter
stationsandthereforerequiredprovisioning fortwelvemonthsoftheyear.94Supplying
88Parker, op. cit., note 5 above, p.'156. 90Parker, op. cit., note 21 above, p. 191, cf. p.
89Roberts, op. cit., note 87 above, vol. 2, p. 208.
203; M van Creveld, Supplying war: logisticsfrom 9' Van Creveld, op. cit., note 89 above, p. 6;
Wallenstein to Patton, Cambridge University Parker, op. cit., note 21 above, p. 199; idem, op.
Press, 1977, p. 5; P Limm, The Thirty Years War, cit. note 5 above, pp. 77-8.
London, Longman, 1984, pp. 83-4; R G Asch, 92Wedgwood, op. cit., note 36 above, p. 385.
'Warfare in the age of the Thirty Years War 93Van Creveld, op. cit., note 89 above, p. 6;
1598-1648', in J Black (ed.), European warfare Parker, op. cit., note 21 above, p. 199.
1453-1815, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1999, pp. 94Gutmann, op. cit., note 13 above, p. 16.
45-68, on pp. 56-9; cf. Parker, op. cit., note 21
above, pp. 45-6.
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such a body with food and fodder was the major problem of military finance and
supply of its time.
However, although the armies were large in comparison with the past, they
remained small in relation to the civilian population and to agricultural output;
military demands for supplies did not therefore necessarily spell famine for civilians.
The 210,000 men under arms at the end of the War represents less than 2 per cent
of the estimated pre-War German population. Martin van Creveld puts forward
plausible calculations to show that in the relatively well developed agricultural areas
of Europe feeding and foddering an army of 60,000 men on the march w-ould have
required relatively small proportions of the agricultural output of the area through
which they moved.95 Moreover, while the total number ofmen under arms was very
large, by the end of the 1620s they were often dispersed to separate areas and
theatres; many of the battles and sieges of the War involved fewer than 20,000
combatants on each side.96 Military pressures on food supplies certainly became
more difficult to sustain if an army came to a halt, for instance to besiege a town
or fortress, or if an army were moving through an area which had already been
plundered. StralsundandPeenemuinde ontheBalticcoastwhere GustavusAdolphus's
forces landed in July 1630 give one example of such circumstances. The area had
been fought over in both the previous two years: Stralsund had been besieged by
Wallenstein in 1628; not far away, he had fought the Danes at Wolgast in 1629.
Wallenstein was by this time at the head of an army ofperhaps 125,000, though its
detachments were quartered over a wide area, in Holstein, Saxony, Brandenburg
and Pomerania.97 Pomerania was reduced to "utter destitution" by January 1629,
Wallenstein reporting that on the nearby island of Riugen "the troops readily eat
dogs and cats, whereas the peasants simply drown themselves in the sea out of
hunger and desperation".98
However, calculations of military demands and civilian supplies such as those
offered by van Creveld fail to take into account the impact of military supply
operations on civil-military relations; in many instances it appears that the unruly,
hostile and violent nature of these relations played a major part in the descent of
civilians into hunger and starvation. Broadly speaking, the military could obtain
their supplies from civilians in ways which were orderly, peaceful and preserved
civilians' physical security (market purchases, taxation, systematic requisition, ad
hoc agreements) or their methods could be disorderly and violent and attended by
serious threats to life as well as property. Orderly and peaceful, though hardly very
pleasant, methods were certainly employed, especially in the earlier years ofthe War.
Sometimes apayment incash orkind (Brandschatzung or"fire-money") was extracted
from local communities by threatening to fire the village or sack the town unless it
was paid. Somewhat similar were payments made by cities in order to avoid
becoming muster places or garrisons. The Brandschatzung system developed into the
95Van Creveld, op. cit., note 89 above, p. 34. 98 Roberts, op. cit., note 87 above, vol. 2, p.
96Bodart, op cit., note 24 above, pp. 22-3, 85; 445. Wallenstein's report is in van Creveld's
Asch, op. cit., note 89 above, p. 57. translation, op. cit., note 89 above, p. 251, note
97Wedgwood, op. cit., note 36 above, pp. 19, where it is mistakenly attributed to Gustavus
222-3, 236-9, 253. Adolphus.
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"contribution system" early in the War, becoming the "mainstay of war finance".99
A "tax" assessment, payable in cash or goods, was made by army commanders of
communities in the vicinity of their troops. Gathering the "tax" was left to local
community leaders: they might pay from local authority treasuries or gather con-
tributions from members ofthe community, or, more likely, both. The sums involved
were very large: Fritz Redlich gives instances of monthly payments of tens of
thousands of florins or thalers continuing over periods of several months or even a
few years.'00 The contributions were typically delivered to the army cashier and
thence to the soldiers as pay in cash or kind; cash was used by the soldiers to
purchase supplies from the army's sutlers, themselves purchasing from local civilian
suppliers, or from the householders on whom they were billeted."'0 The system, at
least in principle, allowed local communities some control over the distribution of
the burden and, although often regarded by historians as only a step away from
plunder, it provided a basis for the orderly and non-violent supply of the military
by civilians.
However, if they were to work, such systems of supply required the military to
establish an appropriately staffed and resourced administration. This could be put
in place only by military forces in stable occupation of a territory: in many parts of
Germany this condition did not obtain. For example, it took Gustavus Adolphus
two years to establish his financial administration of Swedish-occupied Germany.102
Only two years later, after the major defeat ofSwedish forces at Nordlingen in 1634,
the Swedes began their long withdrawal towards the Baltic coast. In practice,
therefore, formal systems oftaxationandassessmentimposedbyarmiesofoccupation
were not characteristic of the War. Instead taxes and contributions were imposed
on a more or less ad hoc basis.
But even these ad hoc mechanisms often failed to supply sufficient resources to
the troops. When this happened, the traditional practice was to "forage" for food
and fodder in the immediate vicinity of wherever the army found itself. In the
absence ofsufficient cash to finance market purchases, "foraging" meant requisition,
seizure and theft. It was disorderly at best, at worst associated with violence and
atrocity. The result was that, by the early 1630s and even earlier in some areas,
relations between troops and local civilians were markedly hostile and punctuated
by atrocities and reprisals committed by both sides. Reviewing the War up to 1630,
Wedgwood writes ofthe "virulent hatred between soldiers and peasants, rising almost
to a frenzy".103 Parker supplies an incident from Bavaria in 1632 in which the
mutilation of plundering soldiers by peasants was revenged by firing villages and
murdering their inhabitants.'" Theibault's history ofthe impact ofthe War in Hesse-
Kassel gives a detailed account of the deteriorating civil-military relations in that
9 F Redlich, 'Contributions in the Thirty 102Roberts, op. cit., note 87 above, vol. 2, p.
Years' War', Econ. Hist. Rev., 1959-60, 12: 621.
247-54, pp. 251-2; G Benecke, Germany in the '03Wedgwood, op. cit., note 36 above, p. 257.
Thirty Years War, London, Edward Arnold, 1978, "Parker, op. cit., note 21 above, p. 200;
pp. 25-6. Benecke, op. cit., note 99 above, pp. 68-69 gives
00Redlich, op. cit., note 99 above, p. 254. details of a similar incident in Swabia in 1632; see
101 Gutmann, op. cit., note 13 above, pp. 38-9. also Friedrichs, op. cit., note 5 above, pp. 186-7.
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area, descending ultimately into unremitting hostility.'05 Crowne's diary, as we have
seen, frequently notes the dangers posed by the bands of marauding soldiers and
ex-soldiers whom he referred to generically as "Croats".
The relevant consequences of these bitter relations were twofold. First, plunder
became destructive rather than simply redistributive. Instead ofmerely carrying off
the goods and impressing the services required to aid their operations, plundering
troops destroyed food, livestock and other goods they could not carry away, and
destroyed growing and standing crops and village buildings, as exemplified by the
reprisal firing noted above. Second, as we shall see in more detail below, these
antagonistic civil-military relations precipitated frequent flights ofcivilians to places
of refuge, separating peasants from their fields, and adversely affecting agricultural
production. The impact ofmilitary methods ofsupply on civilian food stocks during
the Thirty Years' War thus became much more serious than a simple comparison of
the number of troops and Germany's population and agricultural output would
indicate. This would lead us to expect no more than localized civilian nutritional
emergencies caused by exceptional circumstances, but a consideration of the socio-
economic relations of warfare shows how such problems could become serious and
widespread.
The "Transmission" Model
The transmission model depends on the impact of war on the rate at which
disease spreads. Despite some controversy, the way in which bubonic plague is
transmitted is fairly well known and a detailed exposition of the transmission
from rat to flea to human would be otiose.'06 The mechanics of the geographical
spread of plague are not always so well understood, however."'7 Geographical
diffusion of a bubonic plague epidemic requires the geographical spread of
infection amongst rats, and the dispersal of the infected rats themselves or of
infected fleas. Since the infection appears to spread slowly through the rat
population and since neither the species of rat nor the fleas involved travel far
or rapidly by themselves, the geographical spread ofplague is largely accomplished
by an outside agency and that outside agency is human. The classic method for
long distance spread is the transport of infected rats from port to port by infested
ships. Short distance spread may occur similarly by rats transported in barges
or, conceivably, in carts but much more typically by fleas in bundles of
merchandise, especially bedding and clothing, in consignments of cereals, and on
the persons or in the baggage of travellers.'08
The probable ways in which plague was disseminated during the War are as
Wedgwood returns to the theme when reviewing present on any substantial scale in Europe during
the War up to 1637, op. cit., note 36 above, pp. this period: Bradley, op. cit., note 33 above, pp.
410-14. 12-13; Slack, op. cit., note 33 above, p. 9.
'05Theibault, op. cit., note 8 above, pp. 107 For example, Friedrichs, op. cit., note 5
141-53. above, p. 189.
"The epidemiology of pneumonic plague is 108 Hirst, op. cit., note 70 above, ch. XI;
quite different but there is no evidence that it was Pollitzer, op. cit., note 70 above, p. 300.
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follows. As troops moved from one billet to another they would have carried
infected fleas with them-on their persons, in their clothes and bedding-and
civilian houses billeting troops are the most likely sites of military-civilian
transmissions of the disease. Refugees, fleeing to the towns in the face of
advancing troops and returning home later, would similarly have carried fleas to
and from places of refuge. Hence flea transport by troops and civilian refugees
would have spread the disease faster and more thoroughly than in times of
peace. Only the reduction in ordinary commercial traffic and, conceivably, the
possible quarantining ofplague-infected populations by siege may have ameliorated
the situation. That the spread of the disease by troop movements was not merely
a theoretical possibility but was also quantitatively important is suggested by
Werner Sombart's estimate of the scale of inland road transport in Germany
before the railways: he supposed that perhaps 40,000 horses were involved in
such activities, the same number that military historians have suggested were
required to move the more than 200,000 troops and their baggage deployed
towards the end of the Thirty Years' War.'09
Detailed studies of the 1632-7 epidemic in Germany reinforce the relevance of
the transmission model ofmilitary mortality crises to this episode. First, the spread
ofthe plague was correlated with the major troop movements. Erich Keyser's work,
recently confirmed by Eckert, demonstrated that the 1632-7 epidemic began in the
south with Bavaria, Wurttemberg, the Rhine Palatinate, and the lower Rhineland
affectedin 1632-4, alongwiththeareasofSaxonyandSilesiaborderingonBohemia.II0
In 1635 the plague spread to previously uninfected localities within these regions
("infilling"). The next year, the plague slowly advanced north-eastwards but moved
very rapidly down the Saxony tributaries of the Elbe into Brandenburg. From this
year on, the predominant movement was eastwards, reaching the Oder in 1637, with
much "infilling" in 1638, and an advance into Pomerania. The epidemic petered out
on the Pomeranian coast in 1639. These directions of diffusion are broadly similar
to the main military movements of those years."'
1 W Sombart, Der moderne Kapitalismus:
historisch-systematische Darstellung des
gesamteuropaischen Wirtschaftslebens von seinen
Anfangen bis zur Gegenwart, 2nd ed., 2 vols in 4,
Munich and Leipzig, Duncker & Humblot, 1921,
vol. 2.1, p. 341; van Creveld, op. cit., note 89
above, p. 6; Parker, op. cit., note 21 above, p.
199. Sombart's estimate is accepted as a
reasonable one by F Braudel, Civilization and
capitalism 15th-18th century, vol. 2, The wheels of
commerce, London, Fontana Paperbacks, 1985, p.
350. The total number of horses, including not
only draught horses but also farm animals, in
Germany at the time of which Sombart was
writing was several million (H Kellenbenz,
'Germany', in C Wilson and G Parker (eds), An
introduction to the sources ofEuropean economic
history 1500-1800, vol. 1, Western Europe,
London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977, p. 198.)
"° E Keyser, 'Die Ausbreitung der Pest in den
deutschen Stadten', in H Poser (ed.), Ergebnisse
und Probleme moderner geographische Forschung,
Festgabe H. Mortensen, Bremen-Horn, W Dorn,
1954, pp. 207-15; Eckert, op. cit., note 9 above,
pp. 147-54.
... A W Ward, 'The later years', note 85
above, pp. 366-84; Wedgwood, op. cit., note 36
above, pp. 368-40; E A Beller, 'The Thirty Years
War', in J P Cooper (ed.), The decline ofSpain
and the Thirty Years War 1609-48159, The New
Cambridge Modern History, vol. 4, Cambridge
University Press, 1970, pp. 345-9; Biraben, op.
cit., note 74 above, pp. 141-3; R J Bonney,
'France's "war by diversion" ', in Parker (ed.),
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The epidemic was very widely diffused. Eckert states that only 5 ofthe 800 parish
registers in his sample for these years did not record significant mortality crises."2
By way of contrast, John Shrewsbury found evidence that the plague which struck
the British Isles in 1665-8, which was more widely diffused than any other he
documented, was reported from ninety-three separate places in England."3 The
German epidemic was also extraordinarily lethal: whereas a loss of 10 to 15 per cent
of a region's population would have been regarded as a severe crisis in previous
epidemics, "in the period, 1632-39, estimated losses of 40% were commonly ap-
proached or exceeded"."4 Since there is no reason to suspect an increase in case
fatality rates during this epidemic, it seems likely that this high mortality was a
direct result ofthe comprehensive diffusion ofthe disease. Both the route ofdiffusion
ofthe 1632-7 epidemic and its extent strongly suggest the operation ofan uncommon
factor, and the presence and the mobility of the armies of the Thirty Years' War
suffice to explain the unusual features ofthe epidemic and support the "transmission"
model of military mortality crises.
Study of the spread of typhus and relapsing fever, and typhoid and dysenteric
diseases also confirms the applicability of such a model to this War. As is well
known, the transmission of typhus and relapsing fever by the human body louse is
facilitated when people are huddled together in confined places in cold conditions
with inadequate facilities for bathing."15 However, the mechanics ofthe geographical
spread of typhus and relapsing fever have been less intensively studied than those
of plague. It is clear that short distance spread among, say, the inhabitants of a
single house or barracks or camp can be accomplished by the independent movement
ofthe bodylouse. Longdistance spread appears to be accomplished by the movement
of people incubating the disease, suffering from it in a mild form, or convalescing
after it, or carrying infective lice on their persons, or in their clothing or bedding.
The rate of spread has struck observers of modem epidemics as "rapid" and
impressive, even when it has been unaided by modern means oftransport."6 Typhoid
fever and the most prominent dysenteric diseases, amoebiasis and shigellosis, are
transmitted via the faecal-oral route, usually from the ingestion of faecally con-
taminated food or water. Epidemics therefore signal a breakdown or absence of
sanitary arrangements that keep human faeces separate from drinking water and
food. Army camps, refugee camps and makeshift shelters are as a result prominent
sites. People appear able to acquire considerable resistance to local strains ofShigella
and some of the most notable twentieth-century epidemics of shigellosis can be
explained by the introduction of unfamiliar strains by, for example, troop move-
ments."17
112Eckert, op. cit., note 9 above, p. 150. 1'6MacArthur, op. cit., note 81 above, pp.
1"3J F D Shrewsbury, A history ofbubonic 271-2; K D Patterson, 'Typhus and its control in
plague in the British Isles, Cambridge University Russia, 1870-1940', Med. Hist., 1993, 37: 361-81,
Press, 1970, pp. 445-537. on p. 374.
114Eckert, op. cit., note 9 above, p. 150. "' C W LeBaron and D W Taylor, 'Typhoid
115 Snyder, op. cit., note 77 above; Hardy, fever', in Kiple, op. cit., note 79 above, pp.
'Urban famine', note 75 above, p. 413, idem, 1071-7; K D Patterson, 'Amebic dysentery', ibid.,
Epidemic streets, note 75 above, pp. 191-3; V A pp. 568-71; idem, 'Bacillary dysentery', ibid., pp.
Harden, 'Typhus, epidemic', in Kiple, op. cit., 604-6.
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Although the transmission modalities of typhus and relapsing fever on the one
hand and typhoid and dysenteric diseases on the other exhibit major differences, all
may be precipitated by troop movements and civilian distress migration in the
conditions of northern Europe. That such movements occurred on a large scale in
theThirtyYears' Waris aconstant oftheliterature. TheWarnot onlyinvolved armies
ofanunprecedented sizebutthosearmiesmarchedoverdistances unprecedented since
the Crusades. Swedish soldiers marched from the Baltic to Munich; Spanish troops
marched from Genoa to Brussels via Munich and Frankfurt am Main. But, once
again, purely military activity is insufficient to explain the diffusion of plague: an
understanding ofthe politico-confessional character ofthe War and ofthe character
ofcivil-military relationships that emerged during it is crucial for an understanding
of the very large-scale civilian movements which took place.
Civilian movements were of various types. Some forms of migration may have
been relatively unhurried and may consequently have led to relatively few health
problems in reception areas. Many German civilians moved in response to the
changing confessional identity of their territory. While these migrations can be
described legitimately as "forced", they did not, for the most part, occur at the point
ofa cutlass or in fear ofimmediate physical violence. It is often appropriate to refer
tothepeoplewhomigratedinthesecircumstances as"exiles" ratherthan"refugees"."8
However, "distress migrations", unplanned, precipitate, and often resulting in severe
problems ofdisease and undernutrition in the reception area, also took place. Some
civilians were forced to move in search ofshelter when their homes were demolished
to make way for urban fortifications or destroyed by bombardment and arson."9
Particularly in the later stages of the War, civilians often fled at the approach of
soldiers, fearful for their safety.
Studies of Mulhouse and Strasbourg in the Alsace indicate the scale of these
problems and how refugees and city authorities attempted to cope with them.
Mulhouse became a ville de refuge for the rural populations of the area.'20 It also
received Protestant exiles from Colmar and other Protestant regions of Germany,
including Saxony, Brandenburg, Wurttemberg, and Hesse. In October 1632, the
inhabitants ofthe commune ofIllzach fled to Mulhouse and the city authorities felt
obliged to give refuge to them since they were its subjects. These refugees remained
in the town until the arrival ofSwedish forces in February 1633. The entire commune
fled back to Mulhouse at the advance of Spanish troops later that year and stayed
some years. In 1638 it was claimed that the number ofrefugees exceeded the number
of burgesses by 700, indicating they numbered between 1500 and 1800. Although
118The most well known example is the (ed.), Germany: a new social and economic history,
Protestant migration from Bohemia to Saxony vol. 2, 1630-1800, London, Arnold, 1996, pp.
subsequent to the Bohemian counter-Reformation 233-62, on p. 240.
of 1623-4 (Blaschke, op. cit., note 8 above, pp. 120R Oberle, La Republique de Mulhouse
113-15). P G Wallace, Communities and conflict in pendant la guerre de trente ans, Publications de la
early modern Colmar: 1575-1730, Atlantic Faculte des Lettres de Strasbourg, Paris, Les
Highlands, NJ, Humanities Press, 1995, pp. Belles Lettres, 1965, pp. 257-62.
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Raymond Oberle states that they often found shelter with Mulhousian families and
that in calmer moments they were able to venture outside the town walls to cultivate
their fields, it is clear from the correspondence of the town's Magistrate that many
were destitute. Some attempted to stave offdestitution by selling their livestock and
personal possessions and by selling or mortgaging land. Nevertheless, a local
chronicler described many of the refugees as chronically sick and without work,
living in stables, "dirty places" or sleeping in the street, and dying offamine. As the
cemeteries filled, the Magistrate resorted to burying the dead in mass graves. The
alms provided by the town had been insufficient to sustain the refugees in the face
of high food prices.
Strasbourg was another ville de refuge."2' The first influx was precipitated by
the Protestant Ernest von Mansfeld's invasion of Alsace at the end of 1621.
Some 9,812 adult refugees were enumerated by the city authorities in mid-January
1622 and there were children besides. Lammert states that a fifth of the refugees
died in the next few months.'22 According to some contemporary estimates, nearly
100,000 refugees had passed through the town. It was much worse later. In
March 1636, the authorities estimated there were 30,000 in the city. This is an
extraordinary number: not far short of the population of some of the major
German cities of the era. While difficult to credit, the estimate at least serves to
show that the city authorities felt overwhelmed by the influx. Famine took hold.
The Magistrate ordered the expulsion of the refugees and forbade the export of
grain. Forced into the countryside, the famine progressed, according to one
chronicle, to the point of cannibalism.
Theibault's thoughtful and subtle account of the impact of the War in Hesse-
Kassel gives an illuminating insight into the causes of flight.'23 Soldiers first
arrived in Hesse-Kassel in 1623. They were serving in the Imperial forces under
the command of Count Tilly. They were supplied with cash by the civil
administration of the area and directly with cash, food and other goods by
village authorities and the individual households on which the troops were billeted.
These arrangements, although highly burdensome, were at first administered in
a largely orderly way through a provisions ordinance negotiated between Tilly
and the Landgrave of Hesse-Kassel. This does not mean there was no plundering;
there was. But the plunder of this period appears to have been instrumental,
clearly focused on the military requirements for food, fodder and other materiel,
not wantonly destructive or motivated by a desire for booty and, although
accompanied by dire threats, not associated with mortal violence. Villagers
responded with passive acceptance on the ground while supplicating the Landgrave
for relief. Nevertheless, by 1626 even Tilly acknowledged the "distress and poverty
of the currently exhausted and worn down lands". In that year, the parish of
Grandeborn, which had not seen more than 25 burials a year since the mortality
121J-P Kintz, La Societ strasbourgeoise du 122Lammert, op. cit., note 31 above, p. 57.
milieu du XVIe siele a lafin de la guerre de trente 123Theibault, op. cit., note 8 above, pp.
ans 1560-1650: essai d'histoire dhmographique, 141-53.
economique et sociale, Paris, Ophrys, [1984], pp.
110-11, 140-1.
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crisis of 1598, carried out 187. The previous orderliness of civil-military relations
began to break down; in 1626 four civilians were killed by Tilly's soldiers, the
first time this had been recorded. The civil administration was bankrupt and
collapsed; the Landgrave abdicated. After 1626 "villagers began to resort to flight
as their first response to news that troops were coming". Troops were frequently
in the area and flight became constant. By the mid 1630s, but especially after
the arrival of Croatian troops in 1637, the practices of plunder had undergone
substantial changes for the worse. Regulation, however imperfect, under a
negotiated provisions ordinance was superseded by wanton ransacking, arson and
violence: "[b]eing caught by soldiers in the open was tantamount to a death
sentence".
Once again, we see here the importance of the socio-economic relations of
warfare. There were then, as later, sound military reasons for army commanders
to maintain good relations with the local civilian population: civilians provided
some services that would be performed adequately only by willing collaborators:
labour, intelligence and guidance, the latter especially important in an age in
which militarily adequate maps were very rare.'24 Stable, predictable, sustainable
and peaceful tax and assessment procedures held out advantages for the military,
as well as for civilians. Commanders therefore had reason to enforce a disciplined
treatment of the civilian population by their troops. But peaceful methods of
regulating civil-military relations broke down. In understanding this, the socio-
economics of recruiting and maintaining an armed force in early modern Europe
are crucial. The most interesting case to consider is the army of Gustavus
Adolphus, not only because the Swedish phase of the War coincided with the
peak of the mortality crises but also because Gustavus's intentions, as evidenced
by his Articles of War, were to prevent the abuse of civilians at the hands of
his troops. Yet, as early as March 1631, Gustavus's General Teuffel admitted
that his troops were committing "unheard of excesses". Such incidents became
the routine of the Swedish intervention.'25 They happened because Gustavus's
ability to control and discipline his soldiers, as was the case with other
commanders, was limited and undermined by the recruitment of mercenary
regiments through promises, express or implied, ofbooty and plunder. Commanders
could hardly discipline their troops for extracting their promised rewards. To do
so would have been to court disaffection, mutiny and most importantly, desertion:
the "more usual reaction of the troops to low pay or poor conditions".'26 The
absence of significant bonds of kinship, language, nationality or, often, ethnicity
between civilians and the soldiers in their midst also lessened the restraints on
violent expropriation. These absent bonds were not only a consequence of the
wide range of European powers involved in the War: Spain, Holland, Denmark,
England, France and Sweden. Mercenary recruitment practices meant that even
German armies contained significant numbers offoreigners. One Bavarian regiment
124Gutmann, op. cit., note 13 above, pp. '25Roberts, op. cit., note 87 above, vol. 2, pp.
39-41; M van Creveld, Technology and war: from 243-5.
2000 B.C. to the present, New York, The Free 126Parker, op. cit., note 21 above, p. 201.
Press, 1989, pp. 116-18.
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for which details have survived included Italians, Poles, Slovenes, Croats,
Hungarians, Greeks, Dalmatians, Lorrainers, Burgundians, French, Czechs, Span-
iards, Scots and Irish.'27 The result was the emergence of socio-economic relations
between civilians and military forces dominated by fears of violence and atrocity
and to which the predominant civilian response was flight. Flight to crowded
and insanitary places of refuge brought with it enhanced rates of transmission
of plague, typhus, typhoid and dysenteric diseases.
The "Socio-Economic Relations of Warfare"
I have argued that the explanation ofGermany's demographic catastrophe during
the Thirty Years' War must be sought in the impact of the War on mortality, and
have showed that plausible estimates ofbattle mortality were insufficient to explain
any substantial part ofthe demographic loss. An analysis ofcontemporary records,
as catalogued by Lammert, indicated that the leading cause of death in the civilian
mortality crises of the War were plague and hunger, the leading causes of crisis
mortality in peacetime as well as wartime early modem Europe. Germany suffered
a number ofpoor harvests caused by meteorological not military factors during the
1618-48 period and mortality from plague ran at high levels in the northern Italian
cities of the time. I reviewed simulation studies which suggested that substantial
demographic losses could be explained as aconsequence ofaregime ofsuchmortality
but argued that a credible account ofthe demographic loss ofthe Thirty Years' War
mustexplainhowtheWarintensified, multipliedand/orlengthenedtheusualmortality
crises of early modern Europe.
I distinguished three models explaining the impact ofwarfare on civilian mortality,
the "synergy" model in which undernutrition drives disease mortality, the "hunger"
model in which undernutrition leads directly to excess mortality, and the "trans-
mission" model inwhich the exposure ofcivilians to fatalinfectious diseasesincreases.
I argued that nutrition-infection synergies explain little of the excess mortality seen
during the Thirty Years' War, and that there was considerably more support for the
"hunger" and "transmission" models. Both these models required an understanding
ofthe socio-economic relations ofwarfare ifthey were to explain the excess mortality
observed in the War. The primary socio-economic relation between civilians and
military forces was in principle an economic one: military resources had to be
obtained from civilian owners and producers. The character ofthis relationship was
influenced bythe ability ofmilitary commanders and socio-political elites tonegotiate
relations that permitted the military to obtain supplies and civilian producers to
sustain their safety, livelihoods and health. Military commanders were handicapped
by their frequent inability to control the mercenary troops under their command.
The resulting collapse oforderly, regulated, instrumental supply procedures and their
supersession by disorderly, unregulated and wanton plunder introduced widespread
127 F Redlich, The German military enterpriser universal soldier', in Parker, op. cit., note 5
and his workforce, 2 vols, Wiesbaden, F Steiner, above, pp. 171-86, on p. 172.
1964-65, vol. 1, p. 456, cited by G Parker, 'The
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violence into civil-military relations. The "universal soldiers" ofthe War were rarely
inhibited in their relations with civilians by ties of kinship, ethnicity or nationality.
Civilians, fearful ofviolence andatrocity atthehands oftroops, sometimes responded
to violence in kind but often reacted by fleeing to places of refuge. It is the wanton
destruction ofthe peasants' means oflivelihood and their frequent flight from their
fields that explain how the 15 million people of Germany were unable to support
armies of perhaps 210,000 (less than 2 per cent of their number) without repeated
episodes of starvation. It is the flight from violence and atrocity and the conditions
they endured in their places of refuge that explain the exceptionally high mortality
from epidemic disease.
Recent research on mortality within historical demography has moved away
from the brute biological factors of hunger and disease to the beliefs and the
actions, both public and private, of the people subjected to nutritional and
microbiological threats to their well-being. Of hunger in the early modem period,
John Walter and Roger Schofield have suggested that "in so far as mortality
was related to famine, the critical link was not a biological one through nutritional
status, but rather a social structural one which determined how the impact of
food shortage would be distributed between individuals and the range of actions,
including migration, that they might take in response".'28 Specialists in nineteenth-
century mortality, while continuing to controvert the importance of nutrition and
nutrition-infection synergies, have emphasized public action in public health and
housing, and changes, possibly accelerated by public interventions, in social
values, and in domestic hygiene and health behaviours.'29 Specialists in twentieth-
century famine mortality and the impact of "complex political emergencies" on
civilian lives and livelihoods have been impressed by Alexander de Waal's analysis
of the Darfur, Sudan, famine of 1984-5 in which not starvation but social and
economic dislocation producing an increased exposure to disease was found to
underlie the excess mortality.'30 My analysis, by bringing to the fore the socio-
economic relations of warfare, is consonant with the current concern to elucidate
the social determinants of mortality.
Of these streams of research, de Waal's is most closely related to the topic
considered here. While his 1989 book is increasingly cited by demographic
historians,'3' it is his less well-known 1990 paper that attempts a general model
128 Walter and Schofield, op. cit., note 68 States, 1900-1930', in J Caldwell, S Findley, P
above, pp. 53-4. Caldwell, G Santow, W Cosford, J Braid and D
129S Guha, 'The importance of social Broers-Freeman (eds), What we know about health
intervention in England's mortality decline: the transition: the cultural, social and behavioural
evidence reviewed', Soc. Hist. Med., 1994, 7: determinants ofhealth, Health Transition Series 2,
89-113; S Szreter, 'The importance of social 2 vols, Canberra, Health Transition Centre,
intervention in Britain's mortality decline c. Australian National University, 1990, vol. 1, pp.
1850-1914: a re-interpretation of the role of 116-49; E van de Walle and F van de Walle, 'The
public health', Soc. Hist. Med., 1988, 1: 5-37; R I private and the public child', in ibid., pp. 150-64;
Woods, P A Watterson and J H Woodward, 'The Hardy, Epidemic streets, note 75 above.
causes of rapid infant mortality decline in "A de Waal, Famine that kills: Darfur,
England and Wales, 1861-1921 Part I', Popul. Sudan, 1984-1985, Oxford, Clarendon Press,
Stud, 1988, 42: 343-66; D C Ewbank and S H 1989.
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of famine mortality.'32 The model has two variants, applicable to times of peace
and to times of war. In the peacetime version, famine precipitates "social
disruption" and distress migration producing a "health crisis" and excess mortality
from fatal epidemic diseases. In the wartime model, however, the violence
limits people's ability to cope with food shortages and this leads not to the
"impoverishment" seen in peace but to "destitution". Destitution brings death to
some from frank starvation. Instead of the "social disruption" seen in peacetime
famines, "social collapse" ensues, but, although there is a change in terminology,
the "social collapse" of wartime famine brings about a health crisis and excess
mortality due to disease, as before.'33 Death from frank starvation therefore
occurs only in famines attended by war.'34
While de Waal's model is consistent with the experience of the Thirty Years'
War, it fails to explain why some wars are attended by starvation and not others
and, more generally, why the demographic impact of warfare shows the marked
variations evident in the historical and modem record. De Waal's account as
well as the existing historiography therefore, fail to explain what was "special"
about the Thirty Years' War. The explanations of the military mortality crises
of the period given by general and demographic historians are all general
explanations of the demographic impact of warfare in early modem Europe.
Flinn's account is explicitly applied to the whole of early modern Europe; other
historians, once they move away from the myriad specificities of their local
studies, are no different in the broad contours of the accounts they offer. This
leaves us unable to explain why the Thirty Years' War produced such an awesome
demographic catastrophe when other wars of the period did not. The outstanding
counter-example is provided by the Civil Wars in England. The estimated
demographic impact of which was approximately nil.'35
'32A de Waal, 'A reassessment of entitlement
theory in the light of recent famines in Africa',
Develop. Change, 1990, 21: 469-90.
Ibid., pp. 486-8.
My brief review of those few famines for
which reasonably reliable cause of death data are
available shows that this empirical generalization
has no obvious exceptions. For the Soviet famine
of the early 1920s, a study of Saratov Gubernia
found that 10 per cent of the excess mortality in
1921 and 16 per cent in 1922 was recorded as due
to "starvation and scurvy" (Russian Civil War) (S
G Wheatcroft, 'Famine and epidemic crises in
Russia, 1918-22', Ann. Demogr. Hist. (Fr.), 1983,
19: 329-52); studies of famines in Athens in 1942,
the Warsaw Ghetto and the western Netherlands
in 1945 found that "hunger", "frank starvation"
or "malnutrition" were the causes of death in a
significant proportion ofcases (Second World
War) (V G Valaoras, 'Some effects of famine on
the population of Greece', Milbank meml. Fund q.
Bull., 1946, 24: 215-34, p. 222; A van der Lem,
'Food entitlements and coping strategies in the
Warsaw Ghetto famine', BA Dissertation,
University of Leeds, 1995; [Government of the
Netherlands], Malnutrition and starvation in
western Netherlands: September 1944-July 1945, 2
vols., The Hague, General State Printing Office,
1948, vol. 1, p. 25). A study of Kampuchean
refugees encamped on the Thai-Cambodia border
in 1979 found that "malnutrition" accounted for
21 per cent of the deaths recorded in the first
fortnight of the camp's operations (Khmer Rouge
insurgency) (J Adler et al., 'Medical mission to a
refugee camp in Thailand', Disasters, 1981, 5:
23-31). A study conducted during the 1980
famine in Karamoja district, Uganda, gave
"starvation" as the cause of death in 78 per cent
of cases (civil unrest following the Tanzanian
invasion of Uganda) (R J Beillick, and P L
Henderson, 'Mortality, nutritional status and diet
during the famine in Karamoja, Uganda', Lancet,
1980, ii: 1330-3).
13 Wrigley and Schofield, op. cit., note 46
above, table A3.3, estimate a population increase
in England of 3.5 per cent over the 1639-51 Civil
War period as a whole. Population falls of 17,000
and 8,000 are estimated for 1643-44 and 1649-50,
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My study of those wars in comparison with the Thirty Years' War suggests that
while the shorter duration of the wars in England and the greater prosperity of the
English economy played a role in reducing the demographic impact of the English
Civil Wars, what I have termed the socio-economic relations of warfare were
paramount.136 I argue there that the limited level ofatrocity in England, the presence
of enduring social bonds, the absence of hostile "inter-ethnic" relationships and of
mercenaries, reduced the level of abuse and atrocity suffered by civilians, resulting
in levels of distress migration which were low in comparison with those seen in
Germany. This, in turn, limited the rate of transmission of epidemic disease and
kept the number of local mortality crises low. Mortality from frank starvation was
practically absent: the last famine in England appears to have been in 1623, with
the dearth of 1647-9 failing to produce a mortality crisis of significant scale even in
the localities most severely affected.'37
Outside the confines ofearly modern Europe one sees additional determinants of
the socio-economic relations ofwarfare; specifically, the importance ofthe objectives
andthestructure ofthewarringpartiesbecomesapparent. Thatgenocidallymotivated
wars have dire impacts on civilian mortality needs no emphasis. Less obviously, wars
motivated or prolonged by economic predation, as in Sudan since 1983, lead to
specific forms ofsocio-economic relationship between military forces and the civilian
population under its control typically leading to substantially diminished civilian life
chances.'38 Warlordism, defined by the military and economic competition of a
number ofindependent armed forces, as seen classically in China between 1916 and
1928 and more recently in Somalia from 1991 and in Liberia, West Africa, after
about 1993, again leads to specific forms of civil-military relationships with clear
and highly adverse consequences for civilian life chances.139
It thus appears that the new approach to understanding the historical and modern
development ofmortality in which social structures, social and personal behaviour,
public and private action form an essential part of any explanation pretending to
sufficiency and completeness is no less essential in the study of military mortality
crises. In particular, the "socio-economic relations of warfare", the matrix of civil-
military transactions, structured by the nature of the war, the objectives of the
respectively. Wrigley and Schofield, ibid., pp. and international aid', in J Macrae and A Zwi
31-2, warn that defective registration during the (eds), War and hunger: rethinking international
Civil War renders estimates for these years responses to complex emergencies, London, Zed
relatively imprecise. Books in association with Save the Children
'36Q Outram, 'The demographic impact of Fund (UK), 1994, pp. 50-69; D Keen, The
early modern warfare', Soc. Sci. Hist., benefits offamine: apolitical economy offamine
forthcoming. and reliefin Southwestern Sudan, 1983-1989,
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warring parties, civil and military law, regulation, custom and practice, informed by
ideologies of ethnic, religious or national antagonism or affinity, are crucial to an
understanding of how the brute biological facts of disease and nutrition affect a
civilian population in the midst of war.
184